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Preference towards Control in Risk Taking: 








This paper experimentally investigates preference towards 
different methods of control in risk taking.  Participants are 
asked to choose between different ways for choosing which 
numbers to bet on for a gamble. They  can  choose  the 
numbers themselves (control), let the experimenter choose 
(no control), or randomize. It is found that in addition to the 
more conventional preference for control, some participants 
prefer not to control, or randomization. These preferences 
are robust as participants are willing to pay a small amount 
of money to implement their preferred method. Most of the 
participants  believe that the winning probability under 
different methods is the same. Thus, their preferences are 
not  driven by bias in probability belief  such as those 
induced by illusion of control. Participants tend to invest 
less in the risky gamble when they are not offered their 
preferred method.  
                            Keywords: Preference towards control, illusion of control, preference 
                                               for randomization  
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Standard economic theories assume that choice under risk  can be completely described by 
consequences and the underlying probability. Individuals are assumed to be consequentialists 
who only care about the consequences of an event but not the  underlying procedure. Little 
research has been done to understand individuals’ preferences on the procedures generating the 
outcomes. This paper fills the gap in the literature by experimentally investigating if individuals 
have preference over procedures in risk taking that differ in degree of control but have the same 
probability distribution. Three  types of preference towards control  are investigated, namely 
preference for control, preference for no control, and preference for randomization. We study if 
these preferences affect risk taking behavior (e.g., will individuals reduce investment in risky 
assets when they are not offered their preferred method of control?). We also investigate the 
reasons behind such preference to understand if they are mainly driven by preference or bias in 
probability belief such as illusion of control. 
In a hypothetical game, Langer (1975) finds that individuals have a higher valuation of lottery 
tickets if they can choose their own numbers than when  they are assigned random numbers. The 
author attributes the difference in valuation to illusion of control, which refers to the belief that 
the probability of winning is higher when one can choose the numbers oneself. This observation 
represents a challenge for the validity of the expected utility theory (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944),  which predicts  that an individual should be indifferent between these 
methods because the probabilities of winning are objectively the same. However,  it is also 
possible that individuals  prefer to choose their own  numbers  because of source preference 
(Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, & Wakker, 2009; Chew & Sagi, 2008; Tversky & Wakker, 1995) 
rather than illusion of control. More specifically, an individual is said to exhibit source 
preference if she prefers one source of uncertainty (e.g., choosing numbers herself) to another 
(e.g., numbers randomly generated by the computer), even when she believes the probability of 
winning is equally likely.  
On the other hand, some individuals may exhibit preference for no control (e.g., let others to 
choose the numbers) even when they believe the probability of winning is the same. Again, for 
these individuals, their preference seems more compatible with  source preference rather than the 
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expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) or a subjective belief in probability 
(subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954)). Furthermore, some individuals may strictly 
prefer to randomize between different methods of control, which is a puzzle for decision theory 
as it violates both the independence and the betweenness axiom assumed by expected utility 
theory and most non-expected utility theories.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing study which shows that some economic agents 
prefer not to control the process  or  have  preference for randomization,  instead of the more 
conventional preference for control. Charness and Gneezy (2010) is the most closely related 
experimental study. The authors investigate if individuals exhibit illusion of control and if such 
illusion influences the level of investment in a risky gamble. In their experiment, subjects need to 
decide how much to invest in a risky asset whose payoff will be contingent on the outcome of a 
dice roll. They use different treatments dependent on who rolls the dice: (1) subject rolls, (2) 
experimenter rolls, (3) freedom to choose whether subject or experimenter, (4) subjects need to 
pay a small amount of money if they want to roll the dice themselves. The authors find that 
subjects do exhibit illusion of control (prefer to roll the dice themselves), while such illusion 
does not influence the level of investments. However, they assume that the fact that subjects 
prefer to roll the dice is due to illusion of control. Since they do not elicit subjects’ probability 
belief, it remains unclear if individuals prefer to control because of illusion of control or source 
preference.  
One possible reason for the “no difference” result of Charness and Gneezy (2010) is that they are 
averaging across two different groups of subjects: those who prefer to control and those who 
prefer not to control. More specifically, in their “subject rolls” treatment individuals who prefer 
to control will invest more, but those preferring to let the experimenter roll will invest less. On 
the other hand, in the “experimenter rolls” treatment, individuals who prefer not to control will 
invest higher amounts. Hence, a comparison across treatments not conditional on preference may 
not reveal much difference. In fact, in our experiment analyzing the investment level conditional 
on the preferences of subjects, we show that illusion of control does affect investment levels.  
We elicit subjects’ probability belief on the winning probability towards different methods of 
control and can  thus  discriminate between the following theories for explaining preference 
towards control: expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), subjective expected 
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utility (Savage, 1954), source preference (Abdellaoui, et al., 2009; Chew & Sagi, 2008; Tversky 
& Wakker, 1995), and illusion of control (Langer, 1975).  
This paper makes four contributions.  First, we show that individuals exhibit three different types 
of preference towards control: preference for control, preference for no control, and preference 
for randomization. These preferences are quite robust in the sense that some individuals are 
willing to pay a small amount of money to use their preferred method of control. We also find 
that individuals tend to invest more under their preferred method of control, implying that they 
are less risk averse when using their preferred method.  
Second, we propose and identify two forms of preference for randomization which violates the 
independence and the betweenness axiom.  
Third, we show that for most individuals preference towards control is not driven by bias in 
probability belief. In particular, their preference towards control is not due to bias in probability 
belief such as illusion of control as they hold the belief that the winning probability remains the 
same when they have less control. 
Fourth, we find that gender and religious belief are important determinants of preference towards 
control. When it is costless to choose between the methods, females prefer to control more than 
males. Religious individuals are more likely to prefer the randomized method.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 present the experimental design and 
the results. Section 5 discusses the overall analysis, the findings on gender differences, and the 
influence of religiousness on preference towards control. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Experiment 1: Control vs. No Control 
Overview and Method 
To test the hypothesis that individuals have preference towards control, we designed a set of 
experiments, in which subjects are endowed with 10,000 points (1,000 points = 0.5 euro) each, 
are asked how much they will allocate to a risky gamble, and are required to choose between two 
different methods of control when picking three numbers to bet on. The outcome of the gamble 
depends on which ball is drawn from an urn that contains 10 balls numbered from 1 to 10. 
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Participants win 2.5 times of the amount bet if the ball drawn is one of the three numbers chosen. 
In experiment 1a, subjects are free to choose between picking their own numbers or let the 
experimenter choose them; in experiment 1b, subjects need to pay 0.1 euro if they want to pick 
their own numbers; in experiment 1c, subjects need to pay 0.1 euro if they want to let the 
experimenter choose the numbers; in experiment 1d, investments under both methods are elicited 
using strategy method.  
A total of 295 subjects participated in experiment 1, experiment 2, and experiment 3. All subjects 
were university students from  Jena, Germany;  they were randomly recruited from a poll of 
approximately 2,500 subjects using an e-mail recruitment system. The number of subjects in 
each treatment ranged from 28 to 30. Each subject participated only in one of the sessions. These 
were conducted in German and took place in a laboratory, where subjects were randomly seated 
in partitioned cubicles.  Subjects were informed that their lotteries would  be implemented 
privately and they would receive their payment privately at the end of the experiment. Each 
session lasted about 40 minutes. Subjects received a show-up fee of 2.5 euro. 
Experiment 1a: Free to Choose  
Method 
Twenty-eight subjects participated in this experiment, in which each subject was free to choose 
between picking the numbers himself or let the experimenter pick them. After the experiment 
subjects filled in a questionnaire on how much they would invest under the other, non-chosen 
method. 
Results 
Figure 1 (panel a) shows that 19 out of 28 subjects (67.9 percent) chose to pick their own 
numbers.  If subjects were indifferent, we should expect to observe 50 percent choosing either 
method. The binomial test shows the proportion of subjects choosing  to pick the numbers 
themselves differs significantly from the random prediction, p-value = 0.04 (one-tailed test). It is 
also found that conditional on preferring to choose their own numbers, subjects invested 4,157.9 
points under this method and would invest only 3,342.1 points if the numbers were chosen by the 
experimenter, and the difference is significant with p-value equal to 0.04. On the other hand, 
there is no significant difference for those preferring to let the experimenter choose.  
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Experiment 1b: Pay to Gain Control  
In this experiment, we investigate whether subjects are willing to pay a small fee to have more 
control.   
Method 
Thirty subjects participated in this experiment, in which each subject chose between picking the 
numbers herself, costing 0.1 euro, or let the experimenter pick the numbers (free). After the 
experiment, subjects filled in a questionnaire on how much they would invest under the other 
non-chosen method, and on probability belief, gender, and religious beliefs. 
Results 
Nine out of the 30 subjects chose to pay 0.1 euro to have more control, see Figure 1a. Thus, the 
result suggests that preference for control is quite strong, and individuals are willing to pay a 
small fee to gain more control.  Of the nine subjects, only one believed that choosing his own 
numbers would lead to a higher chance of winning. In fact, the remaining 29 subjects held the 
belief that the probability of winning was the same under the two methods. This suggests that for 
most individuals, their preference for control is not due to illusion of control, but by source 
preference.  
Experiment 1c: Pay to Lose Control 
Method  
Thirty subjects participated in this experiment, in which each subject chose between picking the 
numbers himself (free) or let experimenter pick  them (costing 0.1 euro). After the experiment, 
subjects filled in a questionnaire on how much they would invest under the other, non-chosen 
method, and on probability belief, gender, and religious beliefs.  
Results 
Seven out of 30 subjects chose to pay 0.1 euro to use the method involving less control, see 
Figure b. These seven subjects believed the probabilities of winning under the two methods were 
identical. Thus, their choices cannot be explained by subjective probability belief and are more 
compatible with the  source preference hypothesis. Of the 23  subjects  preferring to pick the 
numbers themselves, only one held the belief that there was a higher chance of winning. 
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Experiment 1d: Strategy Method 
In experiments 1a to 1c, the investment amounts under the less preferred method were elicited by 
a  non-incentivized questionnaire. To test  the  robustness of the finding, we employed the 
incentivized strategy method to elicit subjects’ investment decision under both methods.   
Method 
Fifty-nine subjects participated in this experiment,  in which  each subject specified the 
investment amount when he chose the numbers versus when the experimenter chose them. Then 
a dice would be randomly rolled to determine which method to implement. After the experiment, 
subjects filled in a questionnaire on their preference ordering of the two methods,  and on 
probability belief, gender, and religious beliefs.   
Results 
If we compare the investment amount across the two methods, there is no significant difference. 
However, if the comparison is made conditional on preference, it is found that those who 
preferred to control on average invested 13.5 percent less when the experimenter picked the 
numbers,  p-value  =  0.04 (one-tailed).  Two outliers were not included in the analysis, one 
invested 700 percent more and another 93.33 percent more when experimenter chose the 
numbers. Eighteen subjects (30.6 percent) indicated in the questionnaire that they preferred to 
pick the numbers themselves,  while  4 preferred  to let the experimenter pick them, and 37 
subjects were indifferent. Only two subjects believed that choosing the numbers themselves had 
a higher chance of winning, while all others believed the winning probability under the two 
methods was the same.  
 
3. Experiment 2: Control vs. No Control vs. 
Randomization 
Overview and Method 
The objective of experiment 2 was to study preference for randomization. We conducted a set of 
three experiments, in which subjects are asked to choose between the three methods of control, 
method 1: picking the numbers themselves, method 2: let the experimenter pick them, or method 
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3: randomize between the two methods. If the randomized method is chosen, subjects first decide 
how much they will invest under methods 1 and 2, a dice will then be rolled to determine which 
method to implement. If the number rolled is 4 or above, method 1 will be implemented. If the 
number rolled is 3 or below, method 2 will be implemented. For all methods, if the ball drawn is 
one of the three numbers chosen, the subject wins 2.5 times the amount bet, losing the amount 
otherwise.  
In experiment 2a, subjects could freely choose between the three methods; in experiment 2b, 
subjects needed to pay 0.1 euro if they wanted to pick their own numbers or let the experimenter 
pick them; in experiment 2c, subjects needed  to pay 0.1 euro if they wanted  to use the 
randomized method.  
Preference for Randomization 
Preference for randomization is a puzzle for decision theory as it violates both the independence 
and the betweenness axiom assumed by expected utility theory and most non-expected utility 
theories.  
Weak Form of Preference for Randomization 
Denote 𝑠 as the lottery in which the subject chooses the numbers, 𝑒 as the lottery in which the 
experimenter chooses the numbers. A decision maker is said to exhibit a weak form of preference 
for randomization if he is indifferent between 𝑠 and 𝑒, but strictly prefers a mixture of 𝑠 and 𝑒, 
implemented by a random device in which s will be implemented with probability 𝑝 and e will 
be implemented with probability1 − 𝑝, 𝑝 ∈ (0,1). That is, 𝑝𝑠 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑒 ≻ 𝑠~𝑒. The preference 
relation is denoted   and 𝑠~𝑒 means that the decision maker is indifferent between s and e. The 
preference relation is denoted ≻ and 𝑠 ≻ 𝑒 means that the decision maker strictly prefers 𝑠 to 𝑒.  
Note that the preference violates the independence axiom. The preference ordering ≿ satisfies 
independence if: 𝑎 ≿ 𝑏  iff  𝑝𝑎 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑐 ≿ 𝑝𝑏 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑐,∀𝑝 ∈ [0,1]  where  𝑎,𝑏,𝑐  are 
members of a possible choice set, X. 
Strong Form of Preference for Randomization 
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A decision maker exhibits the strong form of preference for randomization if he prefers s to e, but 
strictly prefers a mixture of s and e, implemented by a random device, i.e., 𝑝𝑠 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑒 ≻ 𝑠 ≻ 𝑒. 
Similarly, the logic also applies to the case where 𝑒 ≻ 𝑠, i.e., 𝑝𝑠 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑒 ≻ 𝑒 ≻ 𝑠.  
Note that the preference violates both the independence and the betweenness axiom. The preference 
ordering ≿ satisfies betweenness if: 𝑎 ≻ 𝑏   𝑝𝑎 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑏 ≻ 𝑏 and ~𝑏 ⇒ 𝑝𝑎 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑏 ∼ 𝑏. 
In the existing literature, preference of randomization is defined in relation to uncertainty aversion, 
in which probabilities of some lotteries are unknown (see Eichberger & Kelsey, 1996; Schmeidler, 
1989) and which is thus different from the definition offered above. We denote PR-z as referring to 
preference for randomization defined in the existing literature. There are two different approaches 
to modeling PR-z: the Savage approach and Anscombe-Aumann approach (Anscombe & Aumann, 
1963). In the Savage approach, ambiguity averse subjects have no preference for randomization 
(Eichberger & Kelsey, 1996). In the latter approach, Schmeidler (1989)  shows that ambiguity 
averse subjects do have preference for randomization. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence which clearly shows that some 
individuals have preference for randomization over probabilistically identical lotteries and some 
individuals are willing to pay a small amount of money to use the randomized method. Dominiak 
and Schnedler (2009)  experimentally investigate the relationship between preference for 
randomization (PR-z) and uncertainty aversion. Their main finding is that there is no significant 
relationship between these two attitudes. One important difference between  Dominiak and 
Schnedler’s (2009) and our study is that we focus on investigating preference for randomization 
when probability is known, while they focus on the case where  some probabilities (of the 
lotteries associated with the Ellsberg urn in their experiment) are unknown. 
 
Experiment 2a. Free to Choose 
Method 
Thirty subjects participated in this experiment, in which  each  subject  was asked to choose 
between the three methods of control and specified the investment amount under the chosen 
method. After the experiment, subjects filled in a questionnaire on how much they would invest 
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under method 1 or method 2 for those who did not choose the randomized method, and on 
probability belief, gender, and religious beliefs. 
Results 
Nineteen subjects chose to pick their own numbers (method 1) and 11 subjects chose the 
randomized method, see Figure 1c. This supports our hypothesis that individuals have preference 
for randomization. Eight subjects exhibited the weak form of preference for randomization and 3 
exhibited the strong form.  Only two subjects believed method 1 had a higher chance of winning 
and chose it. 
Experiment 2b. Pay to Gain Control or Lose Control 
Method 
The design is identical with experiment 2a except that subjects  now needed to pay 0.1 euro for 
using method 1 or method 2. Twenty-nine subjects participated in this experiment.  
Results 
When methods 1 and 2 become costly, there are more subjects choosing the randomized method. 
Twenty-five subjects chose method 3, with 5 of them exhibiting the weak form of preference for 
randomization and 2 the strong form. Three subjects chose method 1, and one subject chose 
method 2. One subject believed there was a higher probability of winning under method 1.  
Experiment 2c. Pay to Randomize  
Method 
The design is identical with experiment 2a except that subjects now needed to pay 0.1 euro for 
using the randomized method. Thirty subjects participated in the experiment. 
Results 
When the randomized method is costly, the percentage of subjects choosing this method does not 
drop to zero. Instead, we observed 13.3 percent of subjects willing to pay 0.1 euro to use this 
method, see Figure 1c. All subjects, except two subjects who chose method 1, believed the 
winning probability was identical under method 1 and method 2. 
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4. Experiment 3: Comparative vs. Non-Comparative 
Context    
The third set of experiments was conducted to investigate if preference towards control 
influences the investment amount when subjects are only aware of one method of control when 
making their investment decision.  
Method 
Thirty subjects participated in experiment 3a, in which they decided on the investment amount 
and picked their own numbers. In experiment 3b, 28 subjects decided on the investment amount 
and the experimenter would pick the numbers. After the experiments, subjects filled in a 
questionnaire on their preference for picking their own numbers versus the experimenter picking 
the numbers, and also on how much they would invest if the experimenter picked the numbers 
(in experiment 3a) and if they picked their own numbers (in experiment 3b).  
Results 
If we compare the investment amounts observed in experiment 3b with those observed in 
experiment 1d committed under the condition that the numbers would be chosen by the 
experimenter, it is found that the average investment amount in experiment 3b is significantly 
higher than the average investment amount in experiment 1d (experimenter chose condition), p-
value = 0.04 (excluding four outliers who invested 10,000 points).  This suggests that the 
difference in investment amount under different methods of control is induced by comparative 
context. On the other hand, there are no significant differences between experiment 3a and 
experiment 1d (subjects chose condition).  
 
5.  Overall Analysis 
Preference for Control and Illusion of Control 
Only 10 (4.8 percent) out of 208 subjects (experiment 1b to experiment 2c, in which probability 
beliefs are elicited) believe that the probability of winning is higher when the numbers are 
chosen by themselves. However, 9 out of these 10 subjects prefer to control. Thus, it appears that 
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subjects holding such belief are more likely to exhibit illusion of control. Interestingly, these 
subjects on average invested 3,244.4 points when they chose their own numbers versus 2,300 
points when the experimenter chose the numbers. The difference is significant at the 1 percent 
level. This suggests that illusion of control does affect the investment amount.  
As for the remaining 198 subjects, 93 of them prefer to control. Thus, most subjects preferring to 
control are not driven by illusion of control. For subjects who prefer to have less control, none 
thinks that to let the experimenter choose will lead to a higher winning probability.  
In summary, analyzing  the information on probability belief, we find that for most subjects 
preference towards control is not driven by probability belief. Our findings suggest that the 
source preference theory (Chew & Sagi, 2006, 2008) better explains the majority of subjects’ 
preference for control than the illusion of control theory (Langer, 1975), expected utility theory 
(Savage, 1954), and subjective expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  
Preference for Control and Investment Amount 
Pooling the observations from all experiments and comparing the investment amounts, we find 
that subjects preferring to control on average invested 10.3 percent less when the experimenter 
chose the numbers. The difference in investment amount is significant at the 1 percent level, 
suggesting that those preferring to control will invest significantly less under the less controlling 
method.    
Preference for No Control and Investment Amount 
For the group preferring not to control we find that they on average invested 1.7 percent less 
when they had to pick their own numbers. The finding is weakly significant with p-value = 0.10 
(one-tailed).  
Gender Differences                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
We also find that females are more likely to exhibit preference for control. In experiment 1d, we 
found that females were more likely to prefer picking their own numbers than males. Forty-two 
percent (16 out of 38 subjects) of females preferred to pick their own numbers while only 9.5 
percent (2 out of 21 subjects) of male showed this preference. The difference in proportion is 
significant at the 1 percent level. However, in experiment 2b when it becomes costly to have 
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control, a higher proportion of male than female subjects chose to pick their own numbers. The 
difference in proportion is significant with p-value = 0.08 (one-tailed).    
On the other hand, females  are also less likely to exhibit preference for randomization. In 
experiment 2a, 58.3 percent of male subjects (7 out of 12 subjects) chose the randomized option 
while only 22.2 percent (4 out of 18 subjects) of females did so. The difference in proportion is 
significant at the 5 percent level.   
In addition, females appear to reduce their investment amount more strongly than males when 
they have to let the experimenter pick the numbers while they prefer to pick their own numbers. 
In experiment  1a, conditional on preferring to control, females  on average reduced  their 
investment  amount by 28.1 percent when the experimenter chose the numbers (significantly 
different from zero with p-value equal to 0.02), which is higher than the 6.25 percent observed 
for males (not significantly different from zero). The difference is significant with p-value equal 
to 0.09. If we pool the observations with percentage change in investment less than 100 percent 
(three outliers are excluded) across all experiments, we find that conditional on choosing to 
control, females on average invested  13.7 percent less when the experimenter picked  the 
numbers, with  males  on average investing  5.2 percent less  in this case. The difference is 
significant with p-value equal to 0.05 (one-tailed).  
Finally,  we find that females  tend to invest lower amounts  than males.  For example, in 
experiment 1d, in which participants could choose the numbers, males on average invested 4,310 
points, which is higher than the 2,677.24 points for females, and the difference is significant, p-
value = 0.03. When the experimenter chose the numbers, males invested 4,429.05 points, which 
is higher than the 2,609.21 points observed with females. The difference is significant with p-
value = 0.02. If we make the comparison with observations where subjects chose to pick the 
numbers or let the experimenter pick them, the gender difference is still significant at the 5 
percent level. These results agree with the finding in the existing literature that females tend to 
be more risk averse (see Croson & Gneezy, 2009, for an extensive literature review). 
Religiousness Difference 
We find that more religious subjects are also more likely to prefer the less controlling method 
(let the experimenter choose). Subjects with high religiosity are those who pray more than once a 
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day, once daily, a couple of times a week, once a week, or less than once a week. Subjects with 
low religiosity  are those who never pray. In experiment 1d, we found  that  21.4  percent of 
subjects  in the high religiosity  group preferred  not to control,  which is higher than the  2.7 
percent observed in the low religiosity group. The difference in proportion is significant with p-
value equal to 0.03.  
6.  Discussion 
Standard economic theories assume that choices under risks can be completely described by 
consequences and the underlying probability. Individuals are assumed to be consequentialists 
who only care about the consequences of an event but not the underlying procedure. Using 
laboratory experiments, we show that individuals have preference over procedures in risk taking 
that differ in degree of control but generate the same probability distribution. 
Three types of preference towards control are found: preference for control, preference for no 
control, and preference for randomization. These preferences are quite strong,  and some 
individuals are willing to spend a small amount of money to use their preferred method of 
control. Moreover, preference towards control appears to influence the investment decision, and 
individuals tend to invest lower amounts (i.e., are more risk averse) when they are not offered 
their preferred method of control.  
We find that most subjects’ preferences are not driven by bias in probability belief. In particular, 
most subjects believe that the probability of winning is identical when they choose numbers 
themselves or the experimenter chooses the numbers. This result contributes to the literature by 
clarifying that for most individuals who exhibit preference for control, their preference is not due 
to illusion of control. Thus, the illusion of control (Langer, 1975), expected utility theory (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), and subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954) cannot 
explain a majority of individuals’ choice of  control versus no control. It appears that the source 
preference (Chew & Sagi, 2008) theory can explain these preferences better.  Our experiment 
also reports evidences of preference for randomization. 
Moreover, we show that gender and religious belief are important determinants of preference 
towards control. We find that females are more likely to prefer to control when free to do so. But 
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when it is costly, males are more likely to pay the price.  On the other hand, more religious 
individuals are also more likely to exhibit preference for no control.  
Several questions may be may be worth pursuing in the future. First, it will be interesting to test 
the implications of preference towards control in market behaviors. For example, firms may 
increase sales by offering consumers more control. Strategies such as providing a dominated 
product as a choice may increase consumers’ willingness to pay for the more preferred product. 
Second, it will be intriguing to investigate preference towards control in a context involving 
social preferences. One example is Machina’s Mom problem (Machina, 1989). In this example, 
the mom has one daughter, one son, but only one candy. The mom is indifferent between giving 
the candy to either son or daughter but strictly prefers to use a coin to randomly determine who 
will receive the candy. In this context, the mom may prefer to flip the coin because she thinks it 
is a fair procedure. The finding on the strong form of preference for randomization in this paper 
suggests that the mom may prefer to use a coin to decide who will get the candy even when she 
strictly prefers the son (or the daughter) to get it.  
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Appendix: Instructions 
The experiment was conducted in German language, and the original instructions were also in 
German (available upon request).The treatment titles were not shown in the original 
instructions. 
Instructions (experiment 1a) 
Welcome to our experimental study on decision-making. The experiment will take about 30 
minutes. Each participant will receive a show up fee of 2.5 Euro at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, each participant will have the chance to earn more money according to the instructions 
below.  
You are endowed with 10000 points (1000 points = 0.5 Euro). You can choose to invest any 
point between 0 and 10,000 on one of the following two possibilities (but not both). 
 
Possibility I. You choose the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. You will be asked to 
choose 3 numbers from 1 to 10. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn 
in front of you. You will win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one 
of the numbers you chose, otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
Possibility II. Experimenter chooses the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. The experimenter will 
choose 3 numbers for you and distribute the numbers to you after you choose your investment 
level. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn in front of you. You will 
win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one of 3 numbers you have, 
otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
You will be paid in cash for the points you have at the end of the experiment.  
If you win, your payoff will be equal to  
 
10000 + 2.5x 
where x is the number of points invested.  
If you lose, your payoff will be equal to  
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10000 – x 
 
You will be paid in cash for each point you have at the end of the experiment.  
We now ask you to indicate your decision.  
I wish to choose possibility I / II.        
Please proceed to A in below if you choose possibility I. 
Please proceed to B in below if you choose possibility II. 
 
A. Possibility I. You choose the numbers 
I wish to invest ____ points.  
I would like to choose the following 3 numbers (please mark). 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
6  7  8  9  10 
 
B. Possibility II. Experimenter chooses the numbers 
I wish to invest____ points. 
 
 
Instructions (experiment 1b) 
Welcome to our experimental study on decision-making. The experiment will take about 30 
minutes. Each participant will receive a show up fee of 2.5 Euro at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, each participant will have the chance to earn more money according to the instructions 
below.  
You are endowed with 10000 points (1000 points = 0.5 Euro). You can invest any point between 
0 and 10,000 using investment method I or II. However, if you use choose to use method I, you 
need to pay 0.1 Euro (deduct from your show up fee).   
 
Method I. You choose the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. You will be asked to 
choose 3 numbers from 1 to 10. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn 
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in front of you. You will win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one 
of the numbers you chose, otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
Method II. Experimenter chooses the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. The experimenter will 
choose 3 numbers for you and distribute the numbers to you after you choose your investment 
level. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn in front of you. You will 
win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one of 3 numbers you have, 
otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
 
If you win, your payoff will be equal to  
 
10000 + 2.5x 
 
where x is the number of points invested.  
 
If you lose, your payoff will be equal to  
 
10000 – x 
 





I choose Method I  /  Method II (please circle). 
 
The decision sheets for method I and method II are put inside two  
separate envelopes, labeled I and II. Please open the  
envelopes and write down your decisions. After that, please put back the  
decision sheet to the corresponding envelope. 
 
Instructions (experiment 1c) 
Same as instruction in EXPERIMENT 1B, but participants need to pay 0.1 Euro for using 
method II, and using method I is free.  
 
Instructions (experiment 1d) 
Welcome to our experimental study on decision-making. The experiment will take about 30 
minutes. Each participant will receive a show up fee of 2.5 Euro at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, each participant will have the chance to earn more money according to the instructions 
below.  
You are endowed with 10000 points (1000 points = 0.5 Euro). You can invest any point between 
0 and 10,000 on each of the following two possibilities, yet only one of them will be 
implemented.  After we collect your decisions for each possibility, the experimenter will roll a 
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dice and possibility I will be implemented if the number is greater than or equal to 4. Possibility 
II will be implemented if the number is equal or smaller than 3.  
 
Possibility I. You choose the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. You will be asked to 
choose 3 numbers from 1 to 10. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn 
in front of you. You will win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one 
of the numbers you chose, otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
Possibility II. Experimenter chooses the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. The experimenter will 
choose 3 numbers for you and distribute the numbers to you after you choose your investment 
level. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn in front of you. You will 
win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one of 3 numbers you have, 
otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
 
If you win, your payoff will be equal to  
 
10000 + 2.5x 
 
where x is the number of points invested.  
 
If you lose, your payoff will be equal to  
 
10000 – x 
 
You will be paid in cash for each point you have at the end of the experiment.  
 
We now ask you to indicate your decision for each possibility 
The decision sheets for possibility I and possibility II are put inside two  
separate envelopes, labeled I and II. Please open the  
envelopes and write down your decisions. After that, please put back the  
decision sheet to the corresponding envelope. 
        
Possibility I. You choose the numbers 
 
I wish to invest ____ points if the numbers are chosen by myself.  
 
I would like to choose the following 3 numbers (please mark). 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
6  7  8  9  10 
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Possibility II. Experimenter chooses the numbers 
I wish to invest____ points if the numbers are chosen by the experimenter. 
 
 
Instructions (experiment 2a) 
Welcome to our experimental study on decision-making. The experiment will take about 30 
minutes. Each participant will receive a show up fee of 2.5 Euro at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, each participant will have the chance to earn more money according to the instructions 
below.  
You are endowed with 10000 points (1000 points = 0.5 Euro). You can invest any point between 
0 and 10,000, using either method A or method B. You need to choose which method to use. 
Both methods are explained in below.  
 
Method A 
There are two possibilities, yet only one of them will be randomly implemented.  After we 
collect your decisions for each possibility, the experimenter will roll a dice and possibility I will 
be implemented if the number is greater than or equal to 4. Possibility II will be implemented if 
the number is equal or smaller than 3.  
 
Possibility I. You choose the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. You will be asked to 
choose 3 numbers from 1 to 10. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn 
in front of you. You will win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one 
of the numbers you chose, otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
Possibility II. Experimenter chooses the numbers 
There is an urn which contains 10 balls that are numbered from 1 to 10. The experimenter will 
choose 3 numbers for you and distribute the numbers to you after you choose your investment 
level. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a ball from the urn in front of you. You will 
win 2.5 points for every point invested if the ball drawn belongs to one of 3 numbers you have, 
otherwise you loss the points invested.  
 
 
If you win, your payoff will be equal to  
 
10000 + 2.5x 
 
where x is the number of points invested.  
 
If you lose, your payoff will be equal to  
 
10000 – x 
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You will be paid in cash for each point you have at the end of the experiment.  
 
        
Method B 
The rule is the same as method A except that now you can choose your favorite method (i.e., you 
choose the three numbers or let the experimenter chooses).  
 
Summary 
In summary, in method A, we will randomly determine whether you or the experimenter will 




I choose Method A  /  Method B (please circle). 
 
The decision sheets for method A and method B are put in three different envelopes.  
 
If you have chosen to use method A, please note that the decision sheets for Method A 
possibility I and possibility II are put inside two separate envelopes, labeled AI and AII. You 
need to fill-in for possibility I and possibility II.  
 
If you have chosen to use method B, the decision sheet for Method B is put inside the envelope 
labeled B.  
 
Please open the corresponding envelopes for your chosen method and write down your decisions. 





Possibility I. You choose the numbers 
 
I wish to invest ____ points if the numbers are chosen by myself.  
 
I would like to choose the following 3 numbers (please mark). 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
6  7  8  9  10 
 
Method A 
Possibility II. Experimenter chooses the numbers 
I wish to invest____ points if the numbers are chosen by the experimenter. 
Method B 
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Please circle your choice: 
1.  I wish to choose the numbers by myself. 
2.  I wish to let the experimenter to choose the numbers.  
If you have chosen to choose the numbers by yourself, please choose the investment amount 
and choose the 3 numbers now (please mark). 
 
I wish to invest ____ points.  
I would like to choose the following 3 numbers (please mark). 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
6  7  8  9  10 
 
 
If you have chosen to let the experimenter to choose the numbers, please choose the 
investment amount. 
I wish to invest____ points. 
Instructions (experiment 2b) 
Same as instruction in T5, but participants need to pay 0.1 Euro for using method B, and using 
method A is free.  
 
Instructions (experiment 2c) 
Same as instruction in EXPERIMENT 2A, but participants need to pay 0.1 Euro for using 
method A, and using method B is free.  
 
Questionnaire (experiment 1a, for players who have chosen possibility I) 
 
Thanks for your participation. Now we have one more question for you. Please answer it 
carefully. Your answer will not influence your final payoff. 
 
Now, suppose the experimenter will choose the numbers for you, how many points will you 
invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 1a, for players who have chosen possibility II) 
Thanks for your participation. Now we have one more question for you. Please answer it 
carefully. Your answer will not influence your final payoff. 
Now, suppose you will choose the numbers yourself, how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
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Questionnaire (experiment 1d) 
Thanks for your participation. Now we have some questions for you. Please answer them 
carefully. Your answers will not influence your final payoff. 
 
Q1. Do you prefer to choose the three numbers by yourself or by experimenter? (Circle one) 
1. I prefer to choose the numbers by myself. 
2. I prefer to let the experimenter to choose the numbers for me. 
3. I am indifferent. 
 
Q2. Which of the following is the right description of your thinking on probability of winning? 
(Circle one)   
1.  I believe the probability of wining is higher if I can choose the numbers by myself. 
2.  I believe the probability of winning is higher when the experimenter chooses the 
numbers for me. 
3.  I think there are no differences in winning probability between choosing the numbers 
by myself or let the experimenter to choose the numbers for me. 
Q3. What is your gender? 
1.  Male 
2.   Female 
Q4. What is your age? 
I am ____years old. 
Q5. And what about your religious background? Thinking about the present, how often do you 
pray? 
1. More than once a day  
2. Once daily  
3. A couple of times a week  
4. Once a week  
5. Less than once a week  
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6. Never 
Questionnaire (experiment 1b, for players who have chosen method I) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
 
Q1. Now, suppose the experimenter will choose the numbers for you (and you need to pay 0.1 
Euro for using this method), how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 1b, for players who have chosen method II) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose you will choose the numbers for yourself (and there is no charge on using this 
method), how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
Questionnaire (experiment 1c, for players who have chosen method I) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose the experimenter will choose the numbers for you (and there is no charge on 
using this method), how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 1c, for players who have chosen method II) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose you will choose the numbers for you (and you need to pay 0.1 Euro for using 
this method), how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 2a, for players who have chosen method A) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
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Q1. Suppose you can only choose between choosing the three numbers by yourself or by 
experimenter (i.e., without method A), what is your preference? (Circle one) 
1. I prefer to choose the numbers by myself. 
2. I prefer to let the experimenter to choose the numbers for me. 
3. I am indifferent. 
Questionnaire (experiment 2a, for players who have chosen method B and choose the 
numbers  by himself) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose the experimenter will choose the numbers for you, how many points will you 
invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 2a, for players who have chosen method B and let the 
experimenter to choose the numbers) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose you will choose the numbers yourself, how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 2b, for players who have chosen method A) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1and Q2 is modified as follows, Q3 to Q6 is identical to 
Q2 to Q5 in experiment 1d. 
Q1. Suppose you can only choose between choosing the three numbers by yourself or by 
experimenter (i.e., without method A and there is no charge), what is your preference? (Circle 
one) 
1. I prefer to choose the numbers by myself. 
2. I prefer to let the experimenter to choose the numbers for me. 
3. I am indifferent. 
Q2. Suppose there is no charge for using method B, which method will you choose? (Circle one) 
1.  I prefer to use method A. 
2.  I prefer to use method B. 
3.  I am indifferent. 
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Questionnaire (experiment 2b, for players who have chosen method B and choose the 
numbers by himself) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose the experimenter will choose the numbers for you, how many points will you 
invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 2b, for players who have chosen method B and let the 
experimenter to choose the numbers) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose you will choose the numbers yourself, how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
 
Questionnaire (experiment 2c, for players who have chosen method A) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Suppose you can only choose between choosing the three numbers by yourself or by 
experimenter (i.e., without method A and there is no charge), what is your preference? (Circle 
one) 
1. I prefer to choose the numbers by myself. 
2. I prefer to let the experimenter to choose the numbers for me. 
3. I am indifferent.  
 
Questionnaire (experiment 2c, for players who have chosen method B and choose the 
numbers by himself) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose the experimenter will choose the numbers for you, how many points will you 
invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
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Questionnaire (experiment 2c, for players who have chosen method B and let the 
experimenter to choose the numbers) 
Identical as experiment 1d, except that Q1 is modified as follows: 
Q1. Now, suppose you will choose the numbers yourself, how many points will you invest? 
I will invest ____ points out of 10000 points. 
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